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Abstract
This article suggests that a critical approach as the CLS could have 
deeper and stronger impact on the transformation of reality if it embraced 
a concept of linguistic coherence on a basic level. It presents a general 
critique of Brazilian Courts decision-making process and a claim that in 
cases in which evaluative words and expressions are at stake, there is an 
implicit duty of using an extra step on the reasoning in order to translate 
those words and expressions into descriptive ones. That practice permits 
accountability and transparency of the use of power by judges and deci-
sion-makers in general.
Keywords: Critical legal studies. Coherence. Decision-making process. 
Brazilian Courts. Law on books. Law in action. 
Resumo
Este artigo sugere que uma abordagem crítica como o CLS pode-
ria ter um impacto profundo e forte na transformação da realidade por 
abranger conceito de coerência linguística em nível básico. O presente 
artigo apresenta uma crítica geral ao processo de tomada de decisão dos 
Tribunais Brasileiros e uma reivindicação que, nos casos em que palavras 
e expressões avaliativas estão em jogo, há um dever implícito de ir além 
na argumentação, a fim de traduzi-las em palavras descritivas. Tal prática 
permite exigir transparência no uso do poder por juízes e decisores em 
geral.
Palavras-chave: Estudos Jurídicos Críticos. Coerência. Processo de tomada 
























Th is article will explore the self-declared limits of 
the Critical Legal Studies Th eory – CLS. CLS is a move-
ment that took place in the United States during the late 
1960s and early 1970s2. Th e ideas were later formalized by 
David Trubek and Duncan Kennedy at the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison in May of 1977, when they outlined 
the theory’s major tenets of criticism toward liberalism 
and formal positivism.3 Th e theory intends to reveal and 
ultimately denounce the underlying power relations in 
decisions, denying any possibility of examining decision 
correctness. I think it is possible, however, to go beyond 
this point through an analytical, theoretical instrument; 
I would suggest the possibility of decisions analysis us-
ing the concept of coherence, as used in the prescriptive 
language theory. Despite its theoretical specifi city, the 
argument fi ts into a broader spectrum of ideas, leading 
toward social status quo transformation. Th is explains the 
interest in the CLS. 
Is it possible to reveal and denounce power rela-
tions present in the judiciary deciding practices using an 
analytical instrument of formal logic? Th is question de-
lineates the paper’s scope.
Th e idea is to advance a participative democratic 
idea, enhancing accountability in the judiciary and re-
vealing inconsistencies in the decision-making process 
that weaken its transparency, and therefore impeding 
criticism.
I assume that there is, in Brazil’s case, a defi cit of 
democratic participation in public institutions, and spe-
cifi cally that such a defi cit occurs in relation to the per-
formance of the judiciary. Th us, the main point of interest 
here is the work of judges from a critical perspective.
Th e political inspiration for the argument is the 
idea that transformation implies individual conscious-
ness4; this requires access to information and demystifi -
cation of rhetorical discourses. Th e present undertaking 
2 GORDON, Robert W. Unfreezing legal reality: critical ap-
proaches to law. Florida State University Law Review, Talla-
hassee, v. 15, n. 2, p. 195-220, Summer, 1987. p. 196.
3 UNGER, Roberto Mangabeira: Th e critical legal studies 
movement. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. p. 
1.
4 TRUBEK, David M. Where the action is: critical legal stud-
ies and empiricism. Stanford Law Review, Stanford, v. 36, n. 
1/2, p. 575-622, Jan. 1984. p. 608.
is, thus, the attempt to demonstrate that decisions could 
be more transparent, something that would facilitate dis-
cussion about their political nature.5 
2 A word on the concept of accountability
Th e importance of applying the concept of coher-
ence to judicial decisions refers to the possibility of their 
critical analysis. Public examination of decision ratio-
nales is one of the most eﬀ ective ways to permit interac-
tion between judges and society. Publicity of all decisions 
allows social control of the decision-making power. Th e 
idea that decision makers have to follow the principle of 
coherence is also tightly bound to transparency and ac-
countability6 of the actions of those who retain power by 
delegation. What judges and politicians do has be suscep-
tible to collective knowledge and, therefore, to criticism, 
for the sake of public accountability.
Although the concept of accountability is mostly 
applied to the executive and the legislative powers, its ap-
plicability to the judiciary power is well recognized. Ac-
countability is an important and essential requisite of the 
Rule of Law, which holds that those who occupy oﬃ  ces 
must account for their actions through pre-established 
juridical rules and legal provisions that determine the 
State organs’ limits of the exercise of power.7  Th e judicia-
ry is, therefore, a central institution regarding the concept 
of accountability, since it is responsible for controlling the 
legality of other branches of State power. Th e judiciary 
itself, though, must also account for its decisions in a 
public manner, since it exercises power in the name of 
5 Law application implies choices that have signifi cant im-
pact in social allocation of material, political cultural and 
symbolic resources.  SANTOS, Boaventura de Sousa; RO-
DRIGUES-GARAVITO, Cezar A. Law and globalization 
from below: towards a cosmopolitan legality. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005. p. 29.
6 “Th e requirement for representatives to answer to the rep-
resented on the disposal of their powers and duties, act 
upon criticisms or requirements made of them, and accept 
(some) responsibility for failure, incompetence, or deceit.” 
MCLEAN, Ian; MCMILLAN, Alistair. Th e concise oxford 
dictionary of politics. New York: Oxford University Press, 
2003.
7 “Judicial Independence and Judicial Reform in Latin 
America”. DOMINGO, Pilar. Judicial independence and 
judicial reform in Latin America. In: SCHEDLER, An-
dreas; DIAMOND, Larry; PLATTNER, Mark F. (Ed). Th e 
self-restraining state: power and accountability in new de-
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the whole society. It has the duty to act with transparency 
and responsibility. 
It is also socially expected that a democratic and 
independent judiciary system be impartial and that the 
decisions observe a minimum standard of rationality. 
Th us, ideally, a decider should not pass dubious or sense-
less judgments8 and should consider the basic principles 
of logic and relevant facts.
 Accountability is, therefore, an antidote against 
judicial arbitrariness, given that the judiciary holds enor-
mous power and must respond9 for how this power is 
used.10 Although there are many ways to hold the judi-
ciary accountable, such as inspection by higher courts in 
the hierarchy, my particular interest in this paper is the 
possibility of unveiling the rationales behind decisions 
and the consequent possibility of criticizing them.11 
3 Critical Legal Studies
Judicial decisions criticism is only fully possible if 
the decisions are suﬃ  ciently clear and criticizing a polit-
ical aspect embedded in a judgment presupposes its ade-
quate and public justifi cation. My argument in this article 
is that CLS’ criticism of judicial verdicts can be strength-
ened by assuming a critical concept of coherence, since 
the informative use of language12 entails a minimum of 
rationality. Coherence, thus, serves as a criterion for the 
appreciation of rationality in argumentation. I fi nd it pos-
sible, in this sense, to utilize a theoretical-analytical tool 
along with Critical Legal Studies.  
CLS had two distinct lines of thought: criticism of 
the alienation brought on by juridical doctrine, and de-
constructivism based on North American realism, a com-
8 Th is does not mean that a certain court may never change 
its understanding toward a certain judicial matter. A court 
may modify its understanding, but such a change has to 
be accompanied by valid arguments that support what has 
been decided. 
9 PEREZ-PERDOMO, Rogelio. Latin american lawyers: 
an historical introduction. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2005. p. 130.
10 ROSSEN, Keith S. Th e protection of judicial independence 
in Latin America. Inter. American Law Review, Miami, v. 
19, n. 1, p. 1-35, Oct. 1987. p. 6.
11 GARDNER, James A. Legal imperialism: american lawyers 
and foreign aid in Latin America. Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1980. p. 122.
12 Th e informative use of language is diﬀ erent from the poetic 
use. 
bined critique that results in the idea of “indeterminacy.”13 
What makes CLS important to the present analysis is that 
not only does it present itself as a theoretical movement, 
but also as a political one,14 with the intent to transform 
the individual and social perceptions of consciousness.15 
Th at gives CLS a politically emancipative character. Th e 
movement did not purport a new pre-conceived model of 
social and political arrangement, but defended a constant 
critical surveillance of what the courts do with the law. In 
that sense, one can say that the revolutionary aspect of 
CLS is of a procedural nature. 
CLS may be viewed in four diﬀ erent perspectives: 
a) the movement; b) a school of thought; c) a theory and 
d) a mediatic factoid called “CLS”.16 My specifi c interests 
here are the movement and of the theory called “CLS.” Th e 
movement, because of its collective-action sense with an 
intent of status quo reform, and the theory, because the 
set of ideas helps explain the phenomenon of norm ap-
plication and because it delineates an identifi able set of 
propositions that are constitutive of a specifi c theoretical 
fi eld.17 
Although the CLS tradition has been quite suc-
cessful in demonstrating the asymmetries of power 
among social actors refl ected in normative, cultural and 
13 GABEL, Peter. Law and hierarchy. Tikkun, Berkeley, v. 19, 
n. 2, p. 44, Mar./Apr. 2004. Research Library Core, p. 48
14 “we are united in that we would like our work, in so far as 
it is possible, to help in modest ways to realize the potential 
we believe exists to transform the practices of the legal sys-
tem to help make this a more decent, equal, solidary soci-
ety – less intensively ordered by hierarchies of class, status, 
‘merit’, race, and gender – more decentralized, democratic, 
and participatory both in its own forms of social life and 
in the forms it promotes in other countries.”  GORDON, 
Robert W. Unfreezing legal reality: critical approaches to 
law. Florida State University Law Review, Tallahassee, v. 15, 
n. 2, p. 195-220, Summer, 1987. p. 197.
15 “Th e project of CLS is quite diﬀ erent: While Critical le-
gal scholars seek to show relationships between the world 
views embedded in modern legal consciousness and dom-
ination in capitalist society, they also want to change that 
consciousness and those relationships. Th at is the Critical 
dimension in Critical legal scholarship. In this scholar-
ly tradition, the analysis of legal consciousness is part of 
a transformative politics. Th is is what distinguishes CLS 
from traditional social science.”  TRUBEK, David M. 
Where the action is: critical legal studies and empiricism. 
Stanford Law Review, Stanford, v. 36, n. 1/2, p. 575-622, Jan. 
1984. p. 591.
16 KENNEDY, Duncan. A critique of adjudication: fi n de sie-
cle. Cambridge: Harvard University, 1997. p. 9.
17 KENNEDY, Duncan. A critique of adjudication: fi n de sie-























institutional dimensions, another analytical dimension 
of an instrumental nature may be added: a proposition-
al objective.18 Hence the idea that the theory of language 
and formal logical principles may be useful instruments 
to show the argumentative inconsistencies in judicial de-
cisions, which would further judicial accountability.
4 CLS and coherence: external perspective
Th ere are two possible ways to analyze a certain 
ruling: substantive and formal. Th e substantive evalu-
ation of the “correctness” of any given opinion is very 
problematic, because we would have to admit some moral 
universal principles. A formal analysis, however, requires 
the use of logical principles applicable to language in gen-
eral, as a precondition to communication intelligibility.19 
Two principles that give consistency to communication 
among subjects, and which are “constituent” of language, 
are the principles of non-contradiction and of identi-
ty.20 Th e principle of non-contradiction determines that 
the same individual cannot say distinct and confl icting 
things about the same object, risking the compromise of 
coherence of language. Th e principle of identity relates 
to the fact that an object can only be itself and nothing 
diﬀ erent from itself. Th is way, coherence is a principle of 
prescriptive language.21 
18 Perhaps the reason for which the CLS have not had the 
repercussion that its representatives hoped for may be the 
lack of a theoretic instrumental apparatus to cope with the 
concrete dimension of the judicial decision. “CLS no ha ele-
borado un nuevo programa politico y no ha infl uido ni en 
la vida politica americana ni en la vida interna de  la profe-
sion juridica.”  KENNEDY, Duncan. Notas sobre la historia 
de CLS en los Estados Unidos. Revista Doxa, São Paulo, n. 
11, p. 283-293, 1992. p. 287 (CLS has not elaborated a new 
political program and has not infl uenced either American 
political life or the internal life of the juridical profession.)” 
Another explanation may simply be that, within the ideo-
logical dispute, the CLS representatives were won over. 
“Born of the social movements of the 1960’s, Critical Legal 
Studies launched a powerful critique of law and legal edu-
cation as institutions that actually legitimized the injustices 
of American society. However, like so many of the radical 
attempts of that time, it was largely defeated by the con-
servative forces whose ideas dominate law and society as 
a whole today.” GABEL, Peter. Law and hierarchy. Tikkun, 
Berkeley, v. 19, n. 2, p. 44, Mar./Apr. 2004. Research Library 
Core, p. 43.
19 Such method does not imply any substantial content of 
universal moral rules. 
20 ARISTÓTELES. Organon. São Paulo: Edipro, 2004.
21 An important point is the impossibility that any method of 
Transparency of judicial decisions implies the 
public elaboration of the reasons that led the judge to 
decide in a determined way, allowing verifi cation of the 
rationality of the decisions. Such rationality relates to the 
plausibility of the argument through the use of an intelli-
gible and adequate form, as well as of reasons considered 
adequate to justify a certain decision. It is the idea of co-
herence that allows us to determine the logical plausibility 
of a given speech. “Coherence,” though, can be applied in 
more than one sense, so it is necessary to defi ne it here in 
the sense I intend it.
Th e concept of coherence has two diﬀ erent di-
mensions: internal and external.22 From the internal per-
spective, which is therefore prescriptive in accordance 
with the interpretive tradition of authors like Robert 
Alexy, Ronald Dworking and Neil MacCormick, coher-
ence plays a central role. In contrast, under a critical per-
spective, the idea of coherence is a myth, and the concept 
is considered a rhetorical device for decision legitimacy.23 
I do not use the concept of coherence in the same 
way those authors do, as they propose a certain method-
ology for the production of decisions that imply some de-
gree of normative objectivity. Alexy24 works with a set of 
methodological control norms for the decision making 
process that, although formal, involve an ethical compro-
mise of the decider with a universal minimum such as, 
for example, the supposition of good faith while judging. 
Th is is incompatible with the critical propositions of CLS. 
Dworkin25 envisions an axiological minimum, 
expressed within the compromise of integrity, which 
decision appreciation, in which universal principles are adopt-
ed, may be used in combination with a critical perspective, 
because the latter denies any possibility of universal values.
22 Hart proposes that the law possesses an internal dimen-
sion, according to which the individual has a perception 
of duty in relation to the existence of a normative juridical 
order. Th is internal perspective is, according to the author, 
constitutive of the law and distinctive in relation to other 
normative orders. Th e use of the concept of “internal co-
herence” does not refer here to Hart’s concept, but to a log-
ical-linguistic one. HART, Herbert. O conceito de direito. 
Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 1996. 
23 CLS can be qualifi ed as a skeptical theory, as its theoretical 
proposition is deconstructive and denunciatory of a state of 
things, even though it does not propose a form of optimization 
of norm application. In this sense, in some way, CLS stands in 
oppositions to the traditional and analytical hermeutics.
24 ALEXY, Robert. Teoria da argumentação jurídica. São Pau-
lo: Landy, 2001.
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must be accepted as a precedent condition to come to a 
“correct” decision. Finally, MacCormick26 works with a 
descriptive method of the decision making process that, 
although formal, encourages discussion of the materi-
al “correction” of the decision. CLS rejects entirely any 
discussion of decision “correction,” which makes the two 
theoretical perspectives antagonistic in that sense. Th e 
use I make of the concept of internal coherence bears no 
relation either to the idea of a “correct” decision or to an 
axiological minimal content (or any “substantive” correc-
tion) of the decision. My use of the concept relates to the 
conditions of language intelligibility at a much more basic 
level than is seen in an analysis of the above mentioned 
authors.
CLS’s criticism of the concept of coherence is not 
addressed to the principles of the consequent utilization 
of language. Th at makes it possible to attune that concept, 
on a fundamental level, with a critical approach, while ac-
cepting the principle of indeterminacy.
Th e concept of coherence that is criticized by CLS 
derives from the development of the “science of law” 
(juridical science) in the German theories of the nine-
teenth century. According to that, there would be general 
principles in law that could be known through scientifi c 
methods (induction and deduction) and that would con-
sequently be coded in such a way that law could be ex-
pressed by means of systematic and coherent codes. Th is 
notion of coherence relates to the ideal of a coherent nor-
mative system, the most fundamental norm being more 
general and the most specifi ed ones being more specifi c. 
Th e theory aims at providing a method for the decisions 
to be “correct,” something radically denied by the CLS.
It is important to say that a “scientifi c” idea of 
law is foreign to the North American tradition, although 
this idea infl uenced the juridical teachings in the Unit-
ed States at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of 
the twentieth centuries.27 For Americans, the “science of 
law” is something distant from their reality, because in 
the North American tradition, the primary protagonist 
26 MACCORMICK, Neil. Legal reasoning and legal theory. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003.
27 Th e adoption of the method of case solving is the fruit of 
this infl uence. “Th e introduction to case method in the 
teachings at Harvard Law School during the 1870’s was 
partially grounded on assumptions of juridical science.” 
MERRIMAN, John H. Th e civil law tradition. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1985. p. 79.
in law is the judge, who is a problem solver, not a theo-
rist. Th e tenets of the “science of law” -- emphasis on the 
creation of a juridical cohesive “system,” formalism, and 
limits to the application of equity -- are all factors that in 
theory limit the judge’s activity as a problem solver, and 
therefore are not welcome in that tradition.28 
For the purposes of this paper, therefore, I do not 
want to use the concept of coherence in the same way the 
interpretive authors do. I also do not want to combat the 
concept of coherence that CLS criticizes. From the CLS 
point of view, coherence is a myth that serves to support 
the idea that the judicial system is a logical self-referential 
system, in which there would be always a correct answer 
to whatever legal dispute.
CLS is critical of coherence in the fi rst sense that I 
use the concept. According to this idea,29 contradictions 
in the predominant legal doctrine, the one that advocates 
the existence of logical coherence and of a normative 
“system,” result in the concept of “indeterminacy.” Hence, 
no correct answer or correct decision for a legal problem 
exists. Th e concept of Rule of Law,30 according to CLS, 
does not exist in the manner that the dominant legal doc-
trine intends it. What exists is a Political State, meaning 
that all decisions are substantially political. Th e notion of 
Rule of Law serves to legitimize a state of oppression and 
domination, as it reinforces the deciding manner gener-
ally accepted as valid. Another attack by CLS relates to 
28 MERRIMAN, John H. Th e civil law tradition. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1985. p. 67.
29 Andrew Altman holds that there are two tendencies with-
in CLS, one radical and one moderate. According to the 
author, the radical tendency is associated with deconstruc-
tivism and advocates a lack of objective structure in law or 
any other social institution. Law would be a conjuncture of 
words void of meaning to which anyone could place sig-
nifi cance that seems more suitable to them. Th e moderate 
tendency rejects the aﬃ  rmation of the radical theory that 
there is no structure of objective reality in law or society. 
Th is tendency aﬃ  rms that words do have a nuclear mean-
ing, but that the interpretations given to them are subject 
to moral and political beliefs. In the present paper, the dis-
tinction bears no greater signifi cance, as the principles that 
unite both tendencies are suﬃ  cient to identify them as a 
sole theoretic movement. It appears to me, however, that 
the moderate school more adequately describes the judi-
cial phenomena. ALTMAN, Andrew. Critical legal studies: 
a liberal critique. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1993.
30 Th e expression “Rule of Law” has no precise meaning, im-
plying a set of conditions such as independent and steady 
institutions, democratic government, civil and procedural 























the law’s capacity to coerce the application of power. Th e 
idea that power can be limited by law is a fetish, since law 
is not created to limit the power of those who themselves 
created it. Rule of Law serves to take power away from 
individuals, and therefore must be attacked.31    
In prescriptive language theory, under a formal 
logical perspective, coherence is a concept that implies 
the application of the identity and non-contradiction 
principles to the arguments of any given sender. Th e CLS 
defi nition of the notion of coherence is what I call the 
idea of external perspective coherence. I think acceptance 
of that critique does not preclude the use of the internal 
perspective of coherence as a linguistic tool to expand the 
critical power of CLS. 
Th e CLS critical-theoretical project has four basic 
principles: indeterminacy, antiformalism, contradiction 
and marginality.32 Th e principle of indeterminacy is the 
one according to which law is not systematic and does 
not provide normative answers to all situations. Th ere is 
a certain degree of indeterminacy in legal norms that has 
necessarily to be fulfi lled by the judger’s subjectivity.33 Th e 
anti-formalism principle refutes the pretense of “rational 
neutrality” in the decision making process. Formalism 
is intended as a decision making method, according to 
which it is possible to decide by means of formal logical 
deduction.34 Th e principle of contradiction means that le-
31 ALTMAN, Andrew. Critical legal studies: a liberal critique. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. p. 15/16.
32 TRUBEK, David M. Where the action is: critical legal stud-
ies and empiricism. Stanford Law Review, Stanford, v. 36, n. 
1/2, p. 575-622, Jan. 1984.
33 Th e notion that judges make the law and do not merely 
apply it, according to CLS, has its roots in North American 
judicial realism. Th ey presume that deduction with a math-
ematical style is a myth that serves to legitimize a model of 
judges’ actions. TRUBEK, David M.; SANTOS, Alvaro. Th e 
new law and development: a critical appraisal. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006. p.5. 
34 “Th e second major impact of the welfare state on law is the 
turn from formalistic to purposive or policy-oriented styles 
of legal reasoning and from concerns with formal justice 
to an interest in procedural and substantive justice. Before 
further discussion, these terms should be defi ned. Legal 
reasoning is formalistic when the mere invocation of rules 
and the deduction of conclusions from them is believed 
suﬃ  cient to form every authoritative legal choice. It is 
purposive when the decision about how to apply a rule de-
pends on a judgment of how most eﬀ ectively to achieve the 
purposes ascribed to the rule. Th e diﬀ erence between these 
two types of legal reasoning is one between the criteria 
thought appropriate to the overt justifi cation or criticism of 
oﬃ  cial decisions; it does not pretend to describe the actual 
gal practices refl ect the ideological battle to gain preva-
lence of a certain perspective of human relations. Finally, 
the marginality principle proposes that law is not a key 
factor in determining social behavior.
Th e principle that should be analyzed specifi cal-
ly is that of indeterminacy, because from it derives the 
proposition that decisions are incontrollable. It is with 
this principle that coherence must be compatible for my 
intentions in this paper to make sense. 
One of the central CLS arguments to the criticism 
of coherence in law is that judicial norms are expressed in 
natural language, therefore in polyssemic, imprecise, in-
herently undetermined language. When a norm has to be 
applied, the decision making process through which this 
is done is never a purely rational process, so it is ideolog-
ically conditioned.35 If words are, to a certain extent, un-
determined, so are laws. From that derives the idea that 
there is no logically correct decision, and, consequently, 
the conclusion that judicial decisions are a product of 
judges’ personal choices. If there is no way to determine 
the “correctness” of a given decision, and if judicial de-
cisions are always the expression of the judges’ personal 
views, the decision will always be the result of a political 
option. “Coherence” is criticized by CLS based on the fact 
that it is a false and mystifying declaration that a judicial 
system can be coherent, and that this coherence is related 
to the possibility that a given decision is received as “cor-
rect” (= coherent).36 
Th e assertion that judicial decisions are the ex-
pression of political options has, to CLS, a denunciatory 
character. Th e idea of correctness works as a strategy of 
mystifi cation of the judicial discourse, and CLS empha-
sizes the fact that juridical decisions are a product of the 
causes and motives of decision.” UNGER, Roberto Mang-
abeira. Law in modern society: toward a criticism of social 
theory. New York: Th e Free Press, 1977. p. 194. 
35 An interesting and contemporary example of the concept 
of indeterminacy is Mark Tushnet’s commentary on the 
Bush v. Gore decision. TUSHNET, Mark. Renormalizing 
Bush v. Gore: an anticipatory intellectual history. George-
town Law Journal, Washington, DC, v. 90, n. 1, p. 113-125, 
Nov. 2001. p. 113.
36 TUSHNET, Mark. Renormalizing Bush v. Gore: an an-
ticipatory intellectual history. Georgetown Law Journal, 
Washington, DC, v. 90, n. 1, p. 113-125, Nov. 2001. p. 100. 
Although it can be a perspective that may be criticized as 
reducing the CLS pretensions, it was disseminated in such 























Critical legal studies and coherence in the decision-making process: the Brazilian case
judges’ will and, therefore, the idea that there is a neutral 
outcome of the decision making process is false. CLS uses 
the concept of coherence as a rhetorical instrument to 
show discrepancies in the predominant judicial theory.37   
From a theoretical standpoint, CLS criticizes the 
North American liberal project and states that the accept-
ed and reproduced legal doctrine – called the “dominant 
doctrine” – serves to alienate both the practitioners and 
the individuals. Th e “dominant doctrine” functions as an 
instrument to selectively stop the discussion of certain 
themes and social plans diﬀ erent from the established 
one. For CLS, the questioning of this dominant line of 
thought and judicial practice has become necessary.38
From a political point of view, the CLS project 
aﬃ  rms a program of social transformation, and so pro-
poses the demystifi cation of judicial discourse as some-
thing not purely rational and which legitimizes a deciding 
scheme that, in the fi nal analysis, serves the political pur-
pose of maintaining the domination of one social group 
(the ones who hold power) over another (the ones who 
do not hold power). 
One of the constant statements of the so-called 
“crits”39 is that law and the “political sciences” do not 
possess an ensemble of techniques and institutions that 
can resolve the problem of social domination. Th ey 
also maintain that the predominant legal theory, which 
grounds itself on the concepts of technical rationality, ef-
fi ciency and inexorability of the political and economical 
order as it is, is a device of the exercise of power.
Legal culture is imposed by means of an institu-
tional structure that allows the use of force, and it is a 
prerogative for those who know how to operate such dis-
course. Th is makes it excluding and instrumental.40 
Th e CLS theoretical project that accompanies the 
political one supports itself on the notion of “indetermi-
nacy” and on the necessary interrelation between the in-
37 Trubek cites Mensh’s example (Th e History of Mainstream 
Legal Th ought, in Th e Politics of Law: A Progressive Cri-
tique – D. Kairys e. 1982) TRUBEK, id. p. 594
38 Th e dominant doctrine conforms to the paradigm, accord-
ing to Kuhn. KUHN, Th omas. S. Th e structure of scientifi c 
revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.
39 Abbreviation of “critics,” a notion associated with the polit-
ical posture of theoretic contrast and deconstruction of the 
liberal values and arguments respectively.
40  Th e concept of symbolic power in Bourdieu expresses the 
second kind of power referred to. BOURDIEU, Pierre. O 
poder simbólico. Lisboa: Difel, 1989.
terpreter and the norm, which could approximate it from 
a hermeneutic perspective. However, the complexity of 
the relationship between interpreter and text is not seen 
as a matter to be investigated with the perspective of the 
outcome of such an interaction, nor is it seen as a start-
ing point for the investigation into the decision making 
method.41 Th e idea of indeterminacy works, therefore, 
as a denunciatory vehicle for the inherent politicization 
of the deciding act, since the judger inexorably applies 
his ideology in the process of arriving at a decision. Th at 
practice is part of the “deviationist doctrine”.42 
Indeterminacy can also be explained by the state-
ment that predication, the act of judging, is always a stra-
tegic act, regardless of whether it searches for a norma-
tive sense within a framework of possible meanings43 or 
in a penumbral area.44 Th e matter of predictability of the 
decisions is not fundamental to the CLS critical project, 
but the idea that law is an arena for political struggles in 
which diﬀ erent ideologies compete is. Th e task of defi n-
ing the normative sense of any given norm is a political 
task and must be explained as such. 
It is ethically unacceptable to deny the political di-
mension of legal practices. Not only norms, but law itself 
is undetermined because both the normative meanings 
and the ideology of those who determine them are unde-
termined as well.45
Even if CLS has fi rmly attacked legal formalism, 
the critique of the notion of coherence does not depend 
on the type of reason applicable to a decision, and it is 
aimed at the argument posed in a deductive form. Th e 
possibility of a “correct answer” is denied because de-
cisions are expressions of a political project and do not 
come about as acts of “pure deduction”. 
CLS critique is also aimed at the “correct policy” 
41 Th ere is no similarity between the CLS proposal and a her-
meneutic proposal, such as Gadamer’s. GADAMER, Hans 
George. Verdade e método. Petrópolis: Vozes, 1997. v. 2.
42 UNGER, Roberto Mangabeira. Th e critical legal studies 
movement. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. p. 
15-42.
43 KELSEN, Hans. Teoria pura do direito. São Paulo: M. Fon-
tes, 1991.
44 HART, Herbert. O conceito de direito. Lisboa: Fundação 
Calouste Gulbenkian, 1996.
45 KENNEDY, Duncan. A left  phenomenological critique of 
the Hart/Kelsen theory of legal interpretation. In: CACE-
RES, Henrique et al. (Coord.). Problemas contemporaneos 
de la fi losofi a del derecho. Mexico: Universidad Autonoma 























argument, according to which the correct decision is the 
one that maximizes certain consequences that will proba-
bly appear as a consequence of the decision. If those con-
sequences accomplish a certain purpose in public poli-
cy, then the “right answer” has been found. In the policy 
argument, deduction beginning with a given norm does 
not resolve satisfactorily the matter pending on decision, 
so considerations of non-deductive reasons, standards 
and collective objectives must enter the decision making 
process. 
Dworkin, for example, proposes a decision meth-
od that is highly criticized by CLS because it suggests the 
notion of a “correct answer.”46 Th e fi gure of a Herculean 
judge is condemned by CLS because it is taken as an inad-
equate tool to explain the decision making process since, 
in reality, deciding the best outcome is not an exclusive 
product of rational ponderings, but instead, expression of 
political idiosyncratic preferences.47 Consequently, both 
in a deductive argument and a policy argument, a false 
presumption of implicit ontology would exist. It is pre-
cisely against the idea of an essential “correctness” of de-
cisions that CLS manifests itself. It is not the aﬃ  rmation 
that judicial reasoning follows a deductive form that is 
contested, but the idea that there is a systematic coher-
ence in law that can be evaluated with the result of the 
decision making process.48
Th e concept of coherence used by CLS is related 
to the idea that a supposed judicial system would provide 
“correct” decisions if the “correct” aspects involved in a 
certain matter pending decision were taken into consid-
eration. Coherence is, in this sense, a concept relative to 
a normative system that has a logical sense that must be 
observed, if the correct method is applied. 
46 Dworkin’s ideas are condensed in three of his most famous 
works: Taking Rights Seriously, A Matter of Principle and 
Law’s Empire
47 Dworkin’s project is inspired by the same humanistic ori-
entation as the CLS project, and it seems wrong to think 
that a simplistic opposition between their goals exists. Th e 
most widely disseminated idea of opposition between the 
projects is that Dworkin believes it is always possible to ob-
tain a defi nite answer, while proponents of CLS think that 
no exact answer is ever likely. Despite being inserted in the 
fi eld that CLS calls liberal legal theory, Dworkin concerns 
himself with the individual rights of the subjects in law. See 
KENNEDY, Duncan. A critique of adjudication: fi n de sie-
cle. Cambridge: Harvard University, 1997. p. 129. 
48 KENNEDY, Duncan. A critique of adjudication: fi n de sie-
cle. Cambridge: Harvard University, 1997. Especially chap-
ter 5.
Th e CLS criticism seems correct, but it does not 
imply an absolute denial of rationality in legal practice. 
CLS adopts a methodic doubt about the empirical possi-
bility of “correctness” of judicial decisions or any sort of 
universalization of values, but it does not propose radical 
skepticism. Although the critical posture means a con-
stant attempt of demystifi cation of the discourse and ju-
dicial practice, the idea that decisions must be passed by 
the judiciary seems to be institutionally the less imperfect 
alternative.49 
If the application of legal norms is a political act, 
is it possible to demand of the judiciary some sort of 
coherence for the sake of rationality and predictability 
of the normative sense of decisions? Is accepting inde-
terminacy the same as accepting the impossibility of any 
kind of control over judicial decisions? If the answers 
to these questions are that there is no possibility of any 
controlling or rational appraisal of decisions, and that it 
is not possible to expect rationality from the judiciary, 
then the CLS project will have exhausted itself with its 
own limit of denouncing the status quo.50 I do not think 
this is the case.
49 “I think of my own initial faith in legal reasoning as like the 
religion of eighteenth-century intellectuals who believed 
that there were good rational reasons to think there was a 
God, that the existence of a God justifi ed all kinds of hope-
ful views about the world, and that popular belief in God 
had greatly benefi cial social consequences. But they also had 
confi rmatory religious experiences that were phenomeno-
logically distinct from the experience of rational demonstra-
tion.”KENNEDY, Duncan. Th e critique of rights in critical 
legal studies. in left  legalism/left  critique. Durham: Duke Uni-
versity Press, 2002. p. 192. In an earlier work, however, Ken-
nedy seems to think in a diﬀ erent way. It possibly can be ex-
plained by the fact that the previous article was a manifesto 
rather than a theoretical paper. In his words: “Th e outcomes 
of struggle are not preordained by any aspect of the social 
totality, and the outcomes within law have no ‘inherent logic’ 
that would allow one to predict outcomes ‘scientifi cally’, or 
to reject in advance specifi c attempts by judges and lawyers 
to work limited transformations of the system.” KENNEDY, 
Duncan. Legal education and the reproduction of hierarchy: 
a polemic against the system, a critical America. New York: 
New York Press, 2004. p. 41.
50 Some critics of CLS demand from the movement an an-
swer to the question about what they would substitute for 
the system they criticize. Th e question, as Fischl pointed 
out, makes no sense, because the project is critical and does 
not point to a moral content or a ready plan of social order 
to replace the existing one. FISCHL, Richar Michael. Th e 
question that killed critical legal studies. Law & Social In-
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5 Internal perspective of coherence
I think there are three possible answers to the 
question about the existence of rationality in judicial 
decisions: 1) Decisions are totally controllable and ratio-
nally based; 2) Decisions are absolutely irrational and a 
product of mere personal preferences; 3) Decisions are 
produced with some constrictions to the absolute irratio-
nality, as norms allow some extent of predictability and 
are based on rational arguments.
Th e third answer explains in a more precise way 
what occurs in a judicial decision. Th ere is a way to check 
the rationality in judicial practices, although they are not 
only the product of acts of rational exercise. A second 
conceptual perspective of coherence is turned toward the 
conditions of rationality of the use of language. Th e lan-
guage used in an informative sense (not the poetic use) 
has in coherence a principle that constitutes the possi-
bility of successful inter-subjective interaction. Th e one 
who states something (the emitter) keeps in mind that the 
one who receives the message (the receptor) understands 
what is being said because they generally share the same 
knowledge of the words being used in a certain message 
(semantics) and also share the knowledge of how words 
are being used in that specifi c speech (grammar).51 
Internal coherence is, therefore, that which is ex-
pected of an emitter who professes messages and who 
wants to be understood in a satisfactory way. Th us, the 
more precise the use of words and grammatical organi-
zation of the message, and the more pleasant the style, 
the greater the chances of success in communication. For 
example, if one names an object a book, one cannot si-
multaneously name it a glass without the perception of 
incoherence in the message. Obviously, sometimes the 
concept will be debatable or the insertion of the item 
in one class of objects or another will be a highly ques-
tionable procedure and will depend, to a great extent, on 
the general system construed by a certain community of 
communicating individuals.
In a quite synthesized way, a person who calls a 
51 Evidently there will always be borderline situations in 
which using a certain name to speak of something will not 
be so simple. Someone might have diﬃ  culty in calling a 
clock and a watch by the same name. In reality, in some 
languages there are diﬀ erent words to express similar ob-
jects. In any case, what matters is that language implies co-
herence as an essential requisite to its successful utilization.
certain object x cannot state that the object is a non-x or 
any other object. Simultaneous contradictory pronounce-
ments are incoherent and erode the sense of communi-
cation according to the logical principle of non-contra-
diction. Th e same occurs when someone suggests that a 
certain object, in a given situation, must be subject to a 
certain attribute and, at the same time, suggests that the 
same object cannot be subject to the same attribute. Th is 
only makes sense in a situation in which one (or some) 
condition taken into consideration changes, but it must 
be announced for the sake of message intelligibility. Th e 
internal coherence of language use is, therefore, a condi-
tion for intelligibility of the informative discourse.
6 Compatibility of the internal perspective of 
coherence with the critical theory
What is the benefi t of the use of the concept of in-
ternal coherence in the scope of a critical theory like CLS? 
What is the signifi cance of the conceptual diﬀ erences of 
external and internal coherence for such a theory?
Th e concept of coherence, from the internal per-
spective of language, is perfectly compatible with the 
critical theory. As a formal concept, internal coherence 
serves as a logical criterion for evaluating the isonomous 
use of concepts in the judicial discourse, and it is not vul-
nerable to the criticism of the idea of correctness of deci-
sion results. Internal coherence refers to a level of linguis-
tic rationality that is in a meta-critical position relative to 
the criticism of normative systematic coherence, which 
is the target of CLS attacks. Internal coherence, besides 
not being incompatible with the critical project, can be a 
powerful revealing instrument of the political practices of 
judges, as it renders possible the analysis of the discourse 
of justifi cations for a decision.
Th e growing complexity of ways through which 
social relationships express themselves indicates the also 
growing use of semantically open concepts that allow the 
decider, in the concrete case, to adapt to factual circum-
stances. Because language is imprecise and the law un-
determined, it is impossible to establish a single sense of 
the words with which the norms are composed. It is for 
this reason (and not despite it) that the concept of inter-
nal coherence is useful to a theory that aims at denounc-
ing power relationships expressed in judicial decisions, 
























CLS defends the idea that if the theoretical and 
political contradictions and incoherencies embodied in 
the arguments of those who retain power can be brought 
to light, it would facilitate the process of social transfor-
mation toward a more fair distribution of power, social 
resources and democratic participation. Th is would take 
place as consciousness of power relations is acquired and, 
consequently, discussions about the allocation of such 
power occur. One practice that a judge can use to conceal 
political motives is deciding by means of evaluative (pre-
scriptive) concepts, as though they were descriptive. Th is 
allows the judge to avoid the duty of grounding decisions 
by merely mentioning an evaluative concept present in 
a norm, as if such a concept has an evident descriptive 
sense.
An example of a daily use of language that illus-
trates such a process is someone saying that a football 
player is a “good player.” If we all, as receivers of this 
message, had the right to know all the criteria that de-
termined the valuation of the player, something that 
happens in the case of judicial decisions, the message’s 
emitter should say what descriptive criteria led to such an 
aﬃ  rmation. Th e reason why the use of an evaluative con-
cept is not admissible to justify a certain decision is that 
the emitter is making a petition of principle, in saying, to 
continue the illustration with our example, that football 
player x is good because he “passes well.” But what does 
“well” mean? Someone who wants to check the coherence 
of the valuation made by a football commentator about 
two players has to know what criteria were used to arrive 
at that conclusion, and those criteria must be descriptive, 
or the valuation would be subject to criticism because it is 
based on not entirely revealed elements.  
Th e emitter would have to say that the player is 
good because, for example, a) he is faster than the others; 
b) plays more games than the others because he suﬀ ers 
fewer injuries; c) scores more than the others; d) makes 
better passes than the others, etc.52 Publicity of the de-
scriptive criteria for the judgment about the one who 
is under analysis is necessary to allow for verifi cation if 
52 Th e criteria used for such a valuation would be arbitrary to 
a certain extent, and one way to question them is an ideo-
logical discussion on what concept of “good player” can be 
seen as correct. Coherence guarantees us the internal pos-
sibility of verifying rationality in the use of language by an 
emitter when he holds forth about objects in similar condi-
tions. 
another player, submitted to the same judgment, is to be 
judged impartially or, in other words, isonomically. Oth-
erwise, nothing would prevent a football commenter who 
is unsympathetic to a certain player from stating that he 
is not a good player, even if he obtains results similar to 
the player who was initially evaluated as a “good player.”   
 Th e fact that ruling is a political act, and that the 
decision making process is subject to political and idio-
syncratic infl uences, can lead a person who deals with law 
to become skeptical, in the sense that if ruling is merely 
an act of will without any kind of rational control, there is 
nothing to do but play “roulette” with judicial decisions, 
and ultimately to distance oneself from this fi eld of results 
that refl ect the personal choices of the deciders. On the 
other hand, a theoretical tool for optimizing the law (at 
least from a formal standpoint) can be used in a com-
bative way, as it is theoretically powerful and politically 
active. 
What I state is, hence, the possibility of joining an 
analytical approach to the critical nature of CLS, with the 
purpose of responding to the criticism that CLS oﬀ ers no 
practical applicability resulting from its theoretical goal 
of denouncing the power relations that underlie judicial 
decisions.
7 Evaluative words and their political dimen-
sion
Th e theory of language with which I think it is 
possible to advance the CLS critical project is Universal 
Prescriptivism. Th is theory was developed by Richard 
Hare53 during the second half of the twentieth century 
and aims to explain prescriptive language, especially dif-
ferentiating between two kinds of words and their logical 
meanings: descriptive words and evaluative words. Th e 
core of the theory points to the reasons that ground hu-
man actions and seeks to investigate reason’s role in eval-
uative judgments.54
53 Th e four books in which Hare constructs and develops 
his theory are: HARE, Richard Mervyn. Freedom and rea-
son. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963; HARE, Rich-
ard Mervyn. Moral thinking: its levels, method and point. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981; HARE, Richard 
Mervyn. A linguagem da moral. São Paulo: M. Fontes, 
1996; HARE, Richard Mervyn. Ética: problemas e propos-
tas. São Paulo: UNESP, 2003.
54 Metaethics investigates where our ethical principles come 






















Critical legal studies and coherence in the decision-making process: the Brazilian case
Moral language is prescriptive, as is juridical lan-
guage. Th e imperative form, typical of prescriptive lan-
guage, is expressed through commands, a characteris-
tic which approximates the relationship between moral 
language and legal language. Th e utility of Hare’s theo-
ry for the purposes of this paper is that it helps identify 
the problem of decision reasoning complexity, especially 
when applied to expressions with large semantic impreci-
sion in its evaluative sense.
Th e central point in universal prescriptivism is 
that words’ meanings are linked to how they are used in 
prescriptive discourses. Meaning is not only the link be-
tween a description and an object (the relation between 
something and what it means), but it is also determined 
by the rules that regulate the use of words.
In natural language, words55 possess an “open con-
sistency,” and the application of legal norms reveals the 
complexity that derives from this characteristic. Th e logi-
cal linguistic rules provide words stability in their practi-
cal use, allowing for intelligibility among speakers.56 
Indeterminacy is an inherent feature of the prob-
lem of norms application, a natural derivation from lin-
guistic polysemy. Hare, however, identifi es a specifi c type 
of word that has a particular function in prescriptive dis-
course, since it implies a positive or negative quality of 
the object: the so-called “evaluative word.” 57   
tions? Do they involve more than expressions of our in-
dividual emotions? Metaethical answers to these questions 
focus on the issues of universal truths, the will of God, 
the role of reason in ethical judgments, and the meaning 
of ethical terms themselves. FIESER, James. Ethics. Th e 
University of Tennessee at Martin, Martin. Available at: 
<http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/e/ethics.htm>. 
55 I make here the distinction between natural language and 
symbolic language. 
56 HARE, Richard Mervyn. Freedom and reason. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1963. p. 5. Here, the infl uence of the 
Second Wittgenstein in Hare shows.
57 Evaluative words and expressions are identifi ed by Karl En-
gish with the name “undetermined normative judicial con-
cepts in the appropriate sense.” Th e expression “normative 
concept” has two possible meanings: a) an improper sense: 
normative concept in the sense that it refers to an object 
perceptible by the senses, but that is given a judicial institu-
tional “costume.” As examples we would have: “marriage,” 
“public worker,” and “minor.” Another sense in the use of 
the concept would be b) a proper sense: a normative con-
cept that is always in need of valuation to be applied in the 
case at hand. Th e author states: “If someone is married or a 
minor, this can be ‘established’ through descriptive criteria. 
In contrast, if a characterizing predisposition is ‘undigni-
fi ed,’ if a motive is ‘vile,’ if a document is ‘pornographic,’ if 
Judging is an extremely complex procedure for 
various reasons, including those presented by CLS in 
relation to indeterminacy. Th e complexity of judgment 
elaboration procedure is increased when the applicable 
norms are expressed through words that have evaluative 
functions. Words and expressions like “excessive” and 
“good-faith,” for example, do not have stable descriptive 
meanings because they do not refer to any physical-mo-
lecular phenomena. Th e meaning of those words change 
as they refer to diﬀ erent situations.
Decisions in which evaluative words are used are 
more prone to bring to light judges’ political stances, be-
cause the judger must opt for certain meanings related 
to concepts such as “justice,” “market,” “merit,” etc. An 
example of this is the contractual idea of “good-faith.” To 
perform a contract in “good-faith” is something diﬃ  cult 
to identify precisely. If the judge does not make his eval-
uative options adequately explicit while applying norms 
with evaluative words, a defi cit of reasoning would ex-
ist in the decision. In other words, to say, for example, 
what is a “consumer’s contractual clause in accordance 
with good faith,” is to implicitly assume a concept of mar-
ket, consumer and behavioral expectancy of contractual 
parties. A more liberal judge (in the economic sense of 
the term) will rule diﬀ erently than another with a more 
protective view of the consumer, and this distinction will 
become clearer with greater access to the reasons that de-
termined the verdict.
Th e analysis of decision coherence implies the 
idea of universality of judgments. One who says some-
thing in a given situation must, for coherence’s sake, take 
the same stand, given a similar situation. Th e notion of 
universality of judgments is central to the understanding 
a representation is ‘blasphemous,’ – one must consider for 
this purpose the famous George Grosz painting, represent-
ing Christ on the cross with a gas mask and soldier boots 
on his feet (about the above, RGerST. 64, P.121 et seq.), this 
can only be decided based on a valuation. Th e normative 
concepts of the like are called concepts ‘in lack of valua-
tion substantiality.’ With this horrible expression one in-
tends that the normative volume of these concepts must 
be substantiated case by case, through acts of valuation.” 
ENGISH, Karl. Introdução ao pensamento jurídico. Lisboa: 
Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 2001. p. 213. Th e unde-
termined normative judicial concepts are the ones that are 
so in their own sense, according to the author. Th ese are 
the ones that properly distinguish themselves from the de-
scriptive concepts and that bring specifi c problems to the 























of universal prescriptivism. In order to grant the possibil-
ity of criticism, the opinions we have of things have to be 
of a descriptive nature.58
 While aﬃ  rming something, the speaker is re-
sponsible for the future use of that word.59 Because eval-
uative words60 are those whose meanings depend on the 
qualifi cation of a certain object and not the description of 
the object, meaning is granted, therefore, because of the 
logical-semantic function in the discourse.
Th e complexity of evaluative words’ use is revealed 
in the understanding that, while qualifying other objects, 
their sense always refers to a given situation. Th is char-
acteristic implies that the use of evaluative words is more 
diﬃ  cult than the use of descriptive ones, whose sense re-
mains static between the object and what it means; in the 
latter, the denomination of the object is purely conven-
tional.61 Given that the application of the concept of uni-
58 HARE, Richard Mervyn. Freedom and reason. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1963. p. 10.
59 HARE, Richard Mervyn. Freedom and reason. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1963. p. 12.
60 I use the expressions: “evaluative words,” “evaluative ex-
pressions” and “evaluative terms” interchangeably, indicat-
ing the same idea of distinction between “evaluative” and 
“descriptive.”
61 In onomatopoeia cases, an interesting matter arises that 
may not be mere convention, but instead may hold some 
relation to a physical characteristic of the described object 
and, so, may have something to do with the description of 
an essence. “It is nearly impossible to fi nd another aspect of 
semantics that has caused such interest as onomatopoeia. 
Th e vast literatures about this vary from capricious fanta-
sies about color and sounds of speech to experiences con-
ducted in laboratorial conditions.” ULLMANN, Stephen. 
Semântica: uma introdução à ciência do signifi cado. 2. ed. 
Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 1970. p. 178. Ac-
cording to the author, onomatopoeias have the following 
points of semantic interest: 1) there is an intrinsic similari-
ty between the name and the sense, in such a way that ono-
matopoeias are alike in diﬀ erent languages; 2) the phonetic 
motivation exists between name and sense. Sounds adjust 
to the meaning of the object; 3) even when the sound is 
adequate to the expression of meaning, onomatopoeia will 
come into play if the context is favorable; 4) a word is ono-
matopoeic if felt as such. On the search for phonetic moti-
vation between the word and the object’s sense the author 
says: “Th is motivation search extended itself till the written 
word. Some authors say they feel an analogy between the 
meaning of certain words and their visual form. Th e poet 
Lecomte de Lisle once said that if the French word for the 
idea of ‘paon’ were to be written without the o, one would 
no longer see the bird opening its tail feathers. Going even 
further, Paul Claudel envisions on both tt in the French 
word ‘toit’ (roof) the gable-ends of a house and the caldron 
and wheels in the word ‘locomotive.’ Th ese extravagances 
seem to remount to a primitive way of writing in which 
versalization of judgments relates to the logical principle 
of non-contradiction, and because the meaning of eval-
uative words is situational, the diﬃ  culty in appreciating 
coherence when evaluative words are used is greater than 
when descriptive words are used. Th e problem is brought 
on by the use of formal logical principles applied to lan-
guage.62 Evaluative words have the purpose of qualifying 
an object by positively or negatively appreciating it. Th ey 
are words like, for example, “good,” “excessive,” “pretty,” 
“adequate” and expressions such as “good faith,” “exces-
sively onerous,” “reasonable value,” etc.
Prescriptivism is a principle that regulates the sub-
ject’s actions. In other words, it expresses the individual 
commitment character of a certain verdict. Th e logical 
character of prescriptivism lays in the fact that he who 
professes a sincere judgment must be committed to the 
adoption of the action’s consequences, being the agent in 
any position, even in one that may cause negative conse-
quences.63 
Evaluative words do not distinguish themselves 
from descriptive words by the fact that they are imprecise. 
In fact, one similarity between them is that words like, for 
example, “red” that have a descriptive sense, as well as the 
evaluative word “good,” used to describe a “good car,” are 
equally imprecise in their use.64 Polyssemy (as vagueness 
or imprecision) is not a characteristic that diﬀ erentiates 
descriptive from evaluative words.65 Th e standard to deter-
mine what is a red color or what is a good car is normally 
imprecise. Th is fact is important because one of the diﬀ er-
ences pointed out frequently between norms formulated 
by descriptive words and those formulated by evaluative 
words66 is the semantic vagueness or imprecision of the 
visual symbols were directly representative of designated 
things and were still not submitted to speech.” p. 190. 
62 HARE, Richard Mervyn. A linguagem da moral. São Paulo: 
M. Fontes, 1996.
63 HARE, Richard Mervyn. A linguagem da moral. São Paulo: 
M. Fontes, 1996.
64 ULLMANN, Stephen. Semântica: uma introdução à ciên-
cia do signifi cado. 2. ed. Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gul-
benkian, 1970.
65 ULLMANN, Stephen. Semântica: uma introdução à ciên-
cia do signifi cado. 2. ed. Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gul-
benkian, 1970. p. 123.
66 Th e juridical doctrine mentions the distinction between 
“principles,” “general clauses” and “rules” with basis on this 
criteria. For example, BARROSO, Luis Roberto. Interpretação 
e aplicação da constituição. 4. ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2001. p. 
149; BASTOS, Celso Ribeiro. Hermenêutica e interpretação 
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normative texts that compose them. To say, therefore, that 
norms written with evaluative words are more imprecise 
does not describe accurately the most important aspect for 
the diﬀ erentiation of such types of norms because in both, 
the language is polyssemic, vague and imprecise. What dif-
ferentiates norms formulated with descriptive words from 
those formulated with evaluative words is the logical func-
tion of the words that compose them.67 
Th e complexity in judging while applying norms 
formulated with evaluative words lies in the fact that, be-
cause its meaning does not express something that mani-
fests itself in the world of phenomena, the criteria used to 
determine its meaning are very variable. Hence, someone 
who states that a car is a good car implies in this aﬃ  rma-
tion a set of criteria that determine the meaning of the 
word good used along with the object car. Th e implication 
of this fact in law consists in judicial decisions having to 
necessarily be based in a way that the criteria for the use of 
evaluative words may be publicly explicit in the ratio deci-
dendi in a descriptive way. For example, if it is said that a 
car is “good” because it has a “good” engine, the problem 
of explanation of what makes a car good has only been 
transferred to one aspect of the car, a concept that remains 
impermeable. Aft er all, what is a “good” engine? 
Th e practical result of this distinction and its rele-
vancy to the present discussion lies in the fact that one of 
the ways to demand transparency in judicial decisions is 
to ask the judges to be clear in their decisions’ reasoning 
how the descriptive elements set the criteria for the use of 
evaluative words.
Let us examine an example of applying norms ex-
pressed with evaluative words and how it is possible to 
demand of the judiciary that decisions be professed in 
observance of internal coherence.
Article 6, V, Second part of the Consumer’s Defense 
Code is formulated by means of an evaluative expression 
that shows the diﬃ  culties and points out the risks.
Article. 6: Th e basic rights of consumers are:
V. – the modifi cation of contractual clauses 
that establish      disproportionate installments 
or their revision due to supervening facts that 
make them excessively onerous;  
Expressed in logical form and completed with 
terms in accordance with the Brazilian con-
67 ULLMANN, Stephen. Semântica: uma introdução à ciên-
cia do signifi cado. 2. ed. Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gul-
benkian, 1970. p. 124.
sumer protection law, the imperative sentence 
would be68:
If:
In a contract of suppliance of a product or service 
there is a contractual clause excessively onerous to the 
consumer, due to supervening facts
Th en:
Th ere will be a judicial revision of its content 
to restore the previously existing balance.
It is important to recognize that in this imperative 
there is a problematic expression from the hermeneutic 
point of view, precisely because it does not possess the 
nature of a descriptive expression: “excessively onerous 
contractual clause.” Th e problem lies in the fact that there 
is no way to proceed to a semantic stabilization prior to 
the application of such norm in relation to the terms that 
function as evaluative words, as in the case of “excessive 
onerousness.”
In the process of norm application, the judge will 
have to demonstrate, in descriptive terms, the criteria 
used to formulate the judgment that the consumer’s sit-
uation is considered excessively onerous. He will, then, 
reveal his personal preferences, his values, his way of see-
ing the world in a more transparent way when eﬀ ectively 
demonstrating such criteria. Th e more justifi ed the deci-
sion, the clearer the judge’s political option will be and the 
more visible the possible incoherencies in a set of diﬀ er-
ent decisions.
Th e idea of coherence relates to, as seen, the con-
cept of isonomy, the principle of justice according to 
which agents with similar characteristics and in similar 
situations deserve the same treatment. Th is is also a prin-
ciple of moral language that allows for a logical apprecia-
tion of the rulings. Although there is not just one possible 
and certain content to a moral or judicial judgment, logic 
does not allow inconsistent patterns to be adopted or that 
diﬀ erent judgments for similar situations are made.69
68 It is important to note that  the conduct determined by 
the norm to the supplier is not totally revealed. His duty 
is, having occurred the change of conditions with the con-
sequent excessive onerousness, alter the clause’s content so 
that contractual balance may be restored.
69 Th e Bush v. Gore case decided by the United States Su-























Th e meaning of evaluative words is prescriptive, 
and in agreement with this meaning, it is not acceptable 
from an ethical and logical point of view, that the same 
agent can profess diﬀ erent judgments in identical situa-
tions without losing the idea of isonomy and, therefore, 
moral or judicial coherence. A logical judgment must al-
ways be universal; in other words, the same kind of deci-
sion must be professed for the same kind of problem if all 
things remain the same.70 
plication of a certain norm. In this case, exceptionality is 
transformed into rule, if verifi ed, in posterior cases; in the 
name of coherence, the Court will have to apply the same 
solution. A segment of the decision that suggests the excep-
tion to the principle of universality is: “Th e recount pro-
cess, in its features here described, is inconsistent with the 
minimum procedures necessary to protect the fundamen-
tal right of each voter in the special instance of a statewide 
recount under the authority of a single state judicial oﬃ  cer. 
Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, 
for the problem of equal protection in election processes 
generally presents many complexities.” http://www.law.
cornell.edu/supct/html/00-949.ZPC.html , em 02;11;2006.
70 Th e use of rhetorical resources that mask the intents and 
political reasons of a given decision may be present in the 
judicial sphere and the political one. Political theory draws 
attention to the matter of accountability of those who re-
tain power but do not act according to the arguments they 
present. Although politics is diﬀ erent from law in many 
ways, the concept of coherence can be applied to both fi elds 
of social practices, because both deal with matters of public 
interest and involve delegation of power from society. Dis-
cretion in politics is a lot more visible than in law because 
of the very characteristic of practice of political power. In 
politics, the struggle for access to power marks the public 
disputes in which speeches are made without preoccupa-
tion with coherence, but with an eye toward what gains 
more sympathy from those who receive the message. It is 
a mundane fact that a politician aﬃ  rms something during 
his campaign which is then ignored aft er entering oﬃ  ce. 
In any case, it is possible to verify to some extent the re-
spect that a certain government has toward its electors if 
the campaign promises become government actions. Since 
language is a source of imprecision, it is necessary that 
the arguments in which decisions are based are submitted 
to exhaustive criticism as a way to reveal the values, pre-
conceptions and intentions of those responsible for such 
decisions. International treaties, laws, judicial decisions 
and political discourses are all expressed in natural lan-
guage, which is a source of potential multiple meanings 
of messages. For example, in an article about sustainable 
development and terrorism, Atapattu shows the discursive 
incoherence of the decision makers in a global setting, il-
lustrating how rhetorical discourse of the “international 
terrorism risk” serves the purpose of justifying enormous 
expenses on safety, even while a great portion of the world 
suﬀ ers from malnutrition and lack of basic sanitation, the 
cause of many deaths, despite the minimal comparative ex-
pense of environmental protection. Ironically, many inter-
national treaties, including the Geneva Convention, talk of 
What is “excessively onerous” aft er all? Judges 
certainly saturate decisions with their political points of 
view, values, preferences, world visions and consequential 
considerations. But if these aspects do not clearly appear 
in the decision, the audience (society) cannot criticize it. 
If the judges do not make explicit the reasons that lead 
them to make a decision one way or another, the possibil-
ity of decision criticism is seriously undermined.71 
Taking for granted the idea of indeterminacy of 
norms, what we can do is to demand from the judiciary 
that the valuation options present at the moment of de-
ciding be explained in the fullest way possible and that 
the decision adheres to some kind of linguistic coherence.
8 Conclusions
Evaluative words and expressions are common 
in judgments that should be made under concrete situ-
ations; these expressions do not have a priori descriptive 
meanings. Th ey are words and expressions whose mean-
ing needs to be identifi ed during the decision making 
process.      
Th e requisite of decision motivation should ide-
ally allow the receiver of a decision to know not only the 
deductive process made by the judger, but also the value 
options made, which should appear in the ratio decidendi. 
If the descriptive elements that identify the rea-
sons why judges rule a certain way are not clear, it will 
not be possible to properly analyze the merit of the deci-
sion. Th is procedure has, in my opinion, two diﬀ erent but 
the concern with the environment’s integrity. ATAPATTU, 
Sumudu. Sustainable development and terrorism: interna-
tional linkages and a case study of Sri Lanka. Environmen-
tal Law and Policy Review, Missouri, v. 30, n. 2, p. 273-320, 
Winter, 2006.
71 Th e duty to show motivations behind decisions is treated 
by the procedural doctrine as the “principle of motivation 
of judicial decisions” and aims at granting public control 
over the exercise of juridical exercise. CINTRA, Antonio 
Carlos de Araújo; GRINOVER, Ada Pellegrini; DINA-
MARCO, Candido Rangel. Teoria geral do processo. 19. ed. 
São Paulo: Malheiros, 2003. p. 68. Th e principle of motiva-
tion of judicial decisions performs a political function, as 
one can evaluate the impartiality of the judge and the le-
gality and justice of the decisions. Article 93, IX of the Bra-
zilian Federal Constitution mentions the principle of pub-
licity that guarantees the possibility of checking the acts of 
those involved in judicial procedures. It is in the presence 
of people that the decisions must be made, a principle that 
is also stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
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related consequences. (1) Judges remain apparently free 
to decide similar cases in diﬀ erent ways without having to 
compromise with the idea of coherence; (2) Judges only 
expose partially and indirectly their ideological prefer-
ences.
Th e fi rst consequence derives from the fact that 
if someone does not determine the meaning of a certain 
evaluative expression, indicating its descriptive sense, the 
true meaning of the expression will never be known for 
sure. Th is way, if someone only says that an individual 
acts in good faith without stating what that means, then 
the following moment it could mean the opposite, with-
out it ever being considered contradictory to the criteria 
previously adopted.
Th e second consequence is that by not defi ning 
a word or evaluative expression adequately, the decider 
will not express his ideological convictions. Th e myth of 
neutrality is reinforced, and so is the possibility that deci-
sions can be produced according to an exclusively formal 
deductive method. 
I fi nd it possible to generalize the aﬃ  rmation that 
this model of decision making process is pervasive in 
Brazilian courts. Th is brings on a defi cit of accountability 
of the courts from the point of view of demanding inter-
nal coherence of decisions and renders more diﬃ  cult the 
identifi cation of the judges’ political stances, along with 
their critique.
Th e important legacy of CLS is the idea of inde-
terminacy, the fi ght against formalism and the attempt to 
demystify legal discourse, revealing its inherently politi-
cal content.
Th is legacy, despite being critically powerful, fi nds 
its limit in the radical assumption of the indeterminacy 
of norms and the impossibility of any optimizing theo-
retical approach. Although the decision making process 
is uncontrollable empirically, this does not mean that 
decisions are totally irrational. Th e idea that laws are ex-
pressed in natural language implies its application as a 
discourse that must have a minimum of rationality.
Recognizing the anguishing insecurity resulting 
from the idea of indeterminacy may have the perverse ef-
fect of encouraging a nihilistic or radically skeptical pos-
ture, which seems to me quite contrary to the transfor-
mational propositions of CLS. Th e way out of this logical 
trap is adopting a skeptical moral posture combined with 
criticism grounded in formal logic (no “minimum mor-
al” content assumed), along with adopting a theoretical 
tool that allows for some sort of advancement from the 
critical potential of CLS. Universal Prescriptivism can be 
that instrument because it allows the criticism of norm 
application discourses. 
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